[5] Faure, Samuel B. H., 2024, EU Defence Industrial Policy: Towards a New European Military-Industrial Regime, LUHNIP EU Industrial Policy Report 2024, 178-187.
Executive Summary - The transformation of the European military-industrial regime could be an appropriate political response to the geo-economic challenges facing the European Union (EU) and its member states, including the war in Ukraine. This new European military-industrial regime requires the activation of four politico-institutional changes: the supranationalisation of de- fence industry governance within the EU, the strengthening of interventionist policy instru- ments vis-à-vis the market, the integration of the European Defence Technological Industrial Base (E-DTIB) and the strengthening of the EU’s actorness to regulate foreign dependencies, known as ‘strategic autonomy’. However, despite certain political and institutional adaptations that have accelerated since 2022, EU Member States have not implemented the ‘great trans- formation’ that is a condition for the emergence of a more effective institutional organisation and policy instruments to govern the defence industry within the EU in a context of increas- ing conflictuality and international instability. How can a new European military-industrial regime emerge within the EU to respond more effectively to the geo-economic challenges of the 2020s? The first part of this chapter takes stock of the European military-industrial regime before the start of Ursula von der Leyen’s second term as the head of the European Commission (2024-2029). The second part outlines the inadequacy of the European military-indus- trial regime to meet the geo-economic challenges of the 2020s. The third part demonstrates the reasons that make the proposed new European politico-military regime more desirable for both states and companies, while listing the political, institutional and economic obstacles to its establishment. The fourth part makes three recommendations aimed at removing these obstacles and activating changes in the short term – i.e. before 2027 – that will enable the EU, its member states and its companies to respond more effectively to the new strategic context.
First lines – On 5 March 2024, the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) presented the first-ever EU Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the European Defence Programme (EDIP). These initiatives aim to increase EU defence production capacity, cooperation between the Member States on armaments programmes and reduce foreign dependency in the context of the war in Ukraine, the increase in general worldwide national defence capabilities and a possible US disengagement from Europe in 2025. Although it sets out clear political objectives, the content of the Communications does not signify a break with the Commission's initiatives in the field of the defence industrial policy that has been implemented since the 1990s. The interventionist instruments proposed in these texts lack the financial resources and political incentives to achieve the objectives set. Despite the Commission's ambitions, the intergovernmental paradigm remains unchanged. As a result, there has been no "Colbertist revolution" in Brussels.
[3] Chopin, Thierry and Faure, Samuel B. H., 2021, 2022 Presidential Election: A Euroclash Between a “Liberal” and a “Neo-Nationalist” France Is Coming, Intereconomics – Review of European Economic Policy, 56 (2), 75-81.
First Lines – How could the 2022 French presidential election impact the dynamics of European integration? Generally speaking, there is an increasingly strong link between national elections and domestic politics on the one hand and European issues on the other (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2020). From the point of view of the national context in France, the presidential political system gives major importance to this election because the most strategic decisions with European partners are still made by the president – all the more so in a context of crises that reinforce the role of the European Council (Wessels, 2015). The EU has been marked since the beginning of the 21st century by a “polycrisis” (Juncker, 2016) that has strengthened the institutional position of the European Council (Bickerton et al., 2015). Moreover, the current COVID-19 crisis poses a number of challenges to the citizens of EU member states that have a clear European dimension, such as economic recovery, energy transition, defence policy, etc.
[2] Faure, Samuel B. H., 2021, Anatomie du flexilatéralisme : la politique française d’armement par ses alliances, Revue défense nationale, Tribune n°1321.
Résumé – Comment la France gouverne-t-elle la politique d’armement afin de répondre aux besoins capacitaires et technologiques des forces armées ? Comment l’État parvient-il à résoudre le dilemme du maintien de la souveraineté nationale tout en prenant part à des alliances interétatiques pour produire des avions de combat, des chars d’assaut, des frégates ou des missiles ? Je réponds à cette question en mobilisant le concept de « flexilatéralisme », présentant, d’abord, d’où provient cette pratique politique, puis en détaillant ses éléments constitutifs.
[1] Charillon Frédéric, Ramel Frédéric et al., 2010, Action extérieure et Défense : L’influence française à Bruxelles, IRSEM Papers, Paris, 1, 78p.
Premières lignes – L’Europe de la défense et plus généralement celle de l’action extérieure, est entrée fin 2009 dans une nouvelle phase. La mise en oeuvre du traité de Lisbonne, avec ces nouveaux instruments en matière de politique étrangère et de défense (notamment le développement d’un service européen pour l’action extérieure, mais aussi avec son nouveau processus décisionnel, et la nomination, déjà, de quelques acteurs clefs), campe un nouveau paysage stratégique. Pour la Fraance, cette évolution est accentuée par la décision de réintégrer le commandement intégré de l’Otan, rendue effective en 2009, qui pose à la fois la question de l’influence française au sein des instances atlantiques, et celle de la capacité à garantir celle-ci sans dégarnir l’autre front, celui de l’Union européenne. Dans ce nouveau contexte, quels sont les instruments dont dispose la France pour faire entendre sa voix, ses préférences, pour faire connaître et défendre ses options ? Sinon imposer ses vues ? Quelles sont-elles d’ailleurs ?
Samuel B. H. Faure 